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Multinational Business and Host Countries in Times of Crisis: 
Courtaulds, Glanzstoff and Italy in the Inter-War Period1 
 
by Valerio Cerretano 
Abstract 
Despite the considerable attention granted to the history of international business, we 
still have a limited knowledge of the historical impact of multinationals on host 
economies. This article presents the case of the giant Italian rayon firm Snia Viscosa 
which was acquired by its direct rivals, Courtaulds in the UK and the German firm 
Glanzstoff, in 1927. Italian deflation that underpinned the return of the country to the 
gold standard between 1925 and 1927 and the parlous financial conditions of Snia 
Viscosa proved incentives in what seemed to be a fire sale investment. This 
investment mitigated the credit crunch and allowed Snia Viscosa to have access to 
foreign rayon expertise. Evidence suggests that the regime and economic nationalism 
exerted some pressure on foreign interests and were instrumental in the abandonment 
of plans intended dramatically to reduce Italian rayon output. One contribution of this 
article must be found in the use of business history to illustrate how recessions can 
reshape FDI flows and the tensions which may arise between domestic business 
interests and foreign stakeholders during recessions. The history of Snia Viscosa in 
addition shows the importance of foreign interests and multinationals in the long-term 
industrialisation of Italy.   
 
Historians agree that multinationals have been important conduits of 
capital, entrepreneurship and technology since the late nineteenth 
century.2 Much of the debate continues however to focus predominantly 
on the causes behind their growth.3 As Jones lamented, historians have 
written less ‘about the historical impact of multinationals than the causes 
and determinants of multinational growth.’4 
                                                 
1 I am grateful to three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments. Special 
thanks also go to Ray Stokes, Anthony Gloyne and Robert McMaster, who 
commented on earlier drafts, and to Maria Adorante, for her precious support.   
2 Wilkins, ‘Comparative hosts’, p.19; see also Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business’, 
pp.110-1 and Rollings, ‘Multinational enterprises,’p.399 
3 Jones, ‘Multinationals,’p.364 
4 Idem 
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This article seeks to consider the historical impact of the 
investment that the giant firms Courtaulds in the UK and the German 
firm Vereingte Glanzstoff Fabriken made in Italy in 1927. Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff pioneered the mass-production of rayon, which was the first of 
a large family of man-made fibres of which nylon was later to become the 
best known. In Italy, these firms acquired their low-cost rival Snia 
Viscosa, which found itself on the verge of financial collapse in late 
1926. 5  The evolution of Snia Viscosa after 1927 demonstrated that 
foreign interests proved instrumental in the establishment of the rayon 
industry in Italy. That history offers rich insights into the benefits in 
terms of long-term capital and know-how that domestic firms could 
obtain when taken over by foreign competitors. 
This episode is here considered against the backdrop of post-war 
Italy.6 One conclusion is that the deteriorating conditions of Snia Viscosa 
after 1926 acted as a catalyst to Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s move in 
Italy.7  This followed from a credit crunch beginning in 1925 which left 
Snia Viscosa with no alternative source of fresh capital other than the sale 
of a controlling interest in the firm to Courtaulds and Glanzstoff.8 The 
inference is that the acquisition of Snia Viscosa reflected what in the 
                                                 
5 Amatori, ‘Italy’, p.247 
6 Zamagni, Economic History, pp.210-252 
7 Idem, pp.278-84; Jones, ‘Courtaulds,’pp.119-23; Cerretano, ‘European 
cartels,’pp.605-7  
8 Coleman, ‘Courtaulds,’II, pp.281-2; Cerretano, ‘The benefits,’ pp.268-71 
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economic literature has been defined as a ‘fire sale’ investment (namely 
an investment triggered by the decline in economic conditions of the host 
country), precipitated by Italian deflation after 1925.9  
By late 1925 a monetary stabilisation crisis put an end to the short-
lived though intense industrial growth which had been fuelled by an 
expansionary monetary policy, inflation and monetary instability 
immediately after the First World War.10 After that Britain re-joined the 
gold standard in July 1925 (this monetary system had been suspended 
after the outbreak of the war in 1914), Italy, facing the prospect of 
hyperinflation, could no longer delay financial restoration.11 Unable to go 
back to pre-war parity (this was near to impossible since in Italy inflation 
was much higher than Britain immediately after the conflict), the Fascist 
government, which came into power in 1922, nevertheless pursued the 
return to gold at an over-valued parity (the so-called ‘Quota 90’).12 While 
entailing massive deflation and a credit crunch, the ensuing stabilisation 
crisis hit Snia Viscosa very hard.13 
                                                 
9 Krugman, ‘Fire-sale FDI,’pp.132-58 
10 Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, World economy, pp. 40-51; Piluso, ‘L’Italia,’ pp. 24-
30 
11 Eichengreen, ‘Understanding 1921-1927,’pp.24-56; Eichengreen, Golden fetters, pp.154-84; Baffi, ‘La rivalutazione del 1926-7’, pp. 101-22; 
12 Idem 
13 Eichengreen, ‘Understanding 1921-1927,’pp.24-56 
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The history of Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s investment feeds into 
the debate about Italy’s long-term industrialisation.14 This article shows, 
first, that this investment mitigated the credit crunch which began to take 
hold in Italy after 1925 and which was subsequently exacerbated by the 
world-wide economic crisis after 1929.15 One inference here is that that 
investment avoided the liquidation of Snia Viscosa and state bail-out, 
which was the fate that befell numerous large banks and firms in Italy 
after 1929.16 More important, this article demonstrates that it facilitated 
the import of German and British know-how into Italy, the elaboration of 
innovative technology by the early 1930s and the technological 
convergence between the Italian and the European rayon industry. Of 
some importance is also the conclusion that economic nationalism played 
a role in the successful reconstruction of Snia Viscosa. Evidence seems to 
confirm that the regime, while allowing close ties with foreign 
competitors, favoured plans reducing foreign influence over the 
company’s management, as Coleman first noted.17  
The article is structured as follows. The first section positions this 
article within the existing literature. It argues that the acquisition of Snia 
Viscosa was a fire sale investment that domestic deflation triggered in the 
                                                 
14 Jones, Multinationals and global business, p.277; Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business’, p.111, p.129; 
Wilkins, ‘Comparative hosts’, p.24, p.28; Colli, ‘Multinationals,’p.304 and idem, ‘Foreign 
enterprises,’p.87, p.97 
15 Colli and Amatori, Impresa e industria, pp.183-92 
16 Idem 
17 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378 
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mid-1920s. The second section considers how post-war inflation 
stimulated the early grandiose development of the Italian firm. How 
expansion came to a halt is described in Section III. This demonstrates 
that Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s investment, although initially aimed at 
reducing Italian exports, saved Snia Viscosa from financial collapse. In 
an attempt to evaluate the consequences of foreign control, Section IV 
considers the evolution of Snia Viscosa after 1927, suggesting that 
foreign interests contributed to the technical development of the Italian 
firm. Before concluding, following Sandvick and Storli indications, the 
article pursues an analysis feeding into the broader theme of how 
economic nationalism influenced relations between Courtaulds, 
Glanzstoff and Snia Viscosa.18  
I 
Why did Courtaulds and Glanzstoff invest in Italy in 1927? To 
what extent did Snia Viscosa benefit from this investment? What was the 
attitude of the regime towards foreign interests? This article revolves 
around these questions. In order to address them, however, while 
examining the early history of Snia Viscosa, we need to review the 
literature about multinational business. The early development of the 
Italian firm forms the focus of the next section. This section reviews the 
                                                 
18 Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business,’pp.110-1 
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historical and economic debate about the impact of multinationals on host 
economies.  
It is safe to infer that, although it has sparkled much political and 
economic debate since the 1950s, historians have been comparatively 
uninterested in the theme of multinationals and host countries. 19 
Questions similar to those set in this article have however recently guided 
the works of Rollings, who examined the interference of governments in 
the USA and in the UK with outward foreign investment from those 
countries in the 1960s; of Sandvik and Storli, who examined, in relation 
to Norway in the inter-war period, the crucial role of the relationship 
between multinationals and host governments in the impact of inward 
foreign investment; of Toninelli, who looked at the attitude of Fascism 
towards foreign investment; and, above all, of Colli, who examined the 
role of foreign multinationals in Italian industrialisation. 20 This article 
connects with this strand of the literature. 
                                                 
19 Jones, ‘Multinationals,’p.364 and idem, Multinationals and global capitalism, 
pp.81-5; Blomström, Kokko and Zejan, Foreign direct investment, pp.4-5; Jensen, 
Nation states, p.1, pp. 28-30, pp.33-4; Gilpin, Global Political Economy, pp.302-3; 
Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business,’pp.110-1; Dunning, Explaining, pp.71-109; Rollings, 
‘Multinational enterprises,’p.399 20 Jones, Multinationals and global capitalism, p.277; Rollings, ‘Multinational enterprises and government controls; Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business’, p.111, pp.119-23, p.129; Colli, ‘Foreign enterprises (1913-1972)’ and idem, ‘Multinationals.’  
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Of some importance here is also the broader economic debate 
about the impact of foreign direct investments. 21  This has undergone 
various stages since the immediate post-World War II period.22 In the 
early 1950s, the dominant view was that they had positive implications 
for the balance of payments, while their technological ramifications came 
to be considered in greater detail only later. 23  Also, by the 1970s 
academic consensus began to shift from the notion that foreign 
investment would spread market imperfections into the recipient 
countries, displacing nascent industry there, to the view that it would 
facilitate the transfer of technology.24 A more recent, and possibly more 
balanced, view on this is that the positive effects of inward foreign 
investment, most notably technology spill-overs, cannot be taken for 
granted.25 Scholars seem to agree that the impact of foreign investment 
depended on a number of factors, notably the firm-specific assets and 
combination of skills and resources of the firms going abroad; the sectors 
where these latter operated; and the characteristics of the host economy in 
                                                 21 Blomström, Kokko and Zejan, Foreign direct investment, pp.4-5; Jensen, Nation 
states, p.1, pp. 28-30, pp.33-4; Gilpin, Global Political Economy, pp.302-3 22 Blomström, Kokko and Zejan, Foreign direct investment, pp.4-5 
23  Idem 24 Blomström, Kokko and Zejan, Foreign direct investment, p.5; Jensen, Nation 
states, pp. 40-52 25 See also Blomström, Kokko and Zejan, Foreign direct investment, p.4; Jensen, 
Nation states, p.1,pp.28-30, pp.33-4; Gilpin, Global political economy, pp.302-3; Jones, Multinationals and global capitalism, p. 261 
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receipt of foreign investment.26 In the context of this debate, Sandvik and 
Storli have recently stressed the significance of the power struggle 
between multinationals and governments. 27  In particular, they have 
demonstrated that nationalism and political factors were as important as 
economic forces in shaping this relationship and the success of 
multinationals in the inter-war era.28 In relation to this, the history of the 
investment that Courtaulds and Glanzstoff made in Italy in 1927 confirms 
that foreign investment have been immensely beneficial to industrial and 
economic development. It also seems to confirm, however, that the 
indirect intervention of the government and political factors were equally 
important in the successful reconstruction of Snia Viscosa and the Italian 
rayon industry as a whole.  
Although having ramifications throughout the European and global 
rayon trade, the acquisition of Snia Viscosa primarily had an impact on 
domestic industry. As a result of that investment, the Italian rayon 
industry came to be mainly controlled by foreign investors who owned 
about three quarters of the industry’s equity capital by 1927. 29  The 
findings presented here seem to lend much substance to Colli’s argument 
that foreign investment proved as important as state intervention and 
                                                 26 Idem. 27 Jones, Multinationals and global business, p.277; Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big Business.’, p.111, p.129 28 Idem, pp.119-23 29 Comit Archives (hereafter COMIT), Sofindit Papers, Minutes of the Executive Committee [comitato direttivo], 24 April 1930, SOF 291, bundle [fasc.] 1 
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universal banking in the industrialisation of the country.30The weight of 
foreign and German capital in Italy’s development before the Great War 
has been well documented.31 Yet rather less is known about the impact 
that inward foreign investments after 1918 had on the country’s newer, 
high-tech industries.32 Colli has shown that a massive flow of foreign 
investment resumed after the Great War.33 When reviewing the inflow of 
foreign direct investments, Colli challenged the notion that Italian 
industrialisation was ‘basically endogenous’ and exclusively dependent 
‘on indigenous entrepreneurial forces and on pervasive state 
intervention.’34 In Colli’s words, multinationals played a crucial role in 
Italy’s economic history, ‘acting, in several cases, exactly as 
Gershenkronian substitutes’ – namely, state intervention and mixed 
banking - ‘for weak, or even absent, domestic entrepreneurship.’ 35 
In this article, the current debate is extended by drawing some 
attention to the short-term factors influencing the joint investment of 
Courtaulds and Glanzstoff in Italy. The evidence presented here shows 
that the management of Snia Viscosa sold a controlling stake when the 
                                                 30 Colli, ‘Multinationals’, p.304 and idem, ‘Foreign enterprises’, p. 87, p.97 31 Hertner, Il capitale tedesco; Amatori and Colli, Impresa e industria, p.86; Bonelli, ‘Il capitalismo italiano’, pp.110-21 32 Colli, ‘Foreign Enterprises,’ p.87 33 Idem, p.97 34 Idem, p.87 35 Colli, ‘Multinationals’, p.304 
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Italian firm was facing the prospect of imminent collapse from 1926.36 
The influence of currency movements and short-term financial factors on 
the timing of foreign investment and on foreign firms’ entry modes has 
received some attention in both the historical and economic literature.37 
In their analysis of foreign investment in Britain, Jones and Bostock 
concluded that ‘it is unlikely that short-term currency movements will 
fundamentally influence long-term investment decisions.’38 The history 
of Snia Viscosa shows that the credit crunch, rather than exchange rate 
fluctuations, contributed to shaping investment decisions. Consideration 
has also been given in the literature to the relationship between the drop 
in asset values resulting from financial scarcity and surges of inward 
foreign direct investment. 39  Scholars have established that during 
financial and economic crises foreign direct investment (unlike portfolio 
investment) proved to be resilient and even increased as firms seized the 
chance of buying foreign assets at a ‘fire sale’ price in countries 
experiencing financial hardship. 40  The nexus of crisis, fire sales and 
surging direct investment was described by Paul Krugman as an 
                                                 36 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’ pp.267-9 37 Jones and Bostock, ‘US multinationals’, p. 226; Froot and Stein, ‘Exchange rates,’ pp.1191-1196; Blonigen, ‘Firm-Specific Assets,’1997, p.447 and idem, ‘A Review’, p.386.  38 Jones and Bostock, ‘US multinationals,’p.226 39 Krugman, ‘Fire-sale FDI’, pp.43-4; Lipsey, ‘Foreign direct investment,’p.15, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2012, p.XIII and p.2 40 Lipsey, ‘Foreign direct investment,’p.15, Unctad, World Investment Report 
2012, p.XIII and p.2; Krugman, ‘Fire-sale FDI’, pp.43-4 
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‘empirical regularity’ in history.41 Although supposedly a regularity in 
history, the paucity of data seems however to preclude a systematic 
comparative analysis.42 Against this background, the vicissitudes of Snia 
Viscosa suggests that a business history perspective may add new 
dimensions to our understanding of that nexus. 
The fact that Courtaulds made a fire sale investment in Italy could 
already be gauged from Coleman and Jones’ distinct accounts of 
Courtaulds’ foreign operations, on which this article builds. 43 To the 
extent that Snia Viscosa and Italy form its main focus, this article takes a 
somewhat different perspective from that followed by Coleman and 
Jones. Like Coleman and Jones’ works, however, this article draws 
extensively on qualitative sources. These include a wide variety of 
records kept by these companies at their headquarters in England, 
Germany and Italy. These sources comprise reports and memoranda on 
visits paid by leading German and British technologists to Snia Viscosa’s 
plants, and various agreements and compacts that these firms made over 
two decades. Of some importance are also the minutes of Snia Viscosa’s 
board of directors and the statistical data sets which associations of 
producers and the British government regularly produced in the interwar 
years.  
                                                 41 Idem 42 Athukorala, ‘Foreign direct investment,’p.198 43 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p. 281-4, pp.296-9 and idem, Courtaulds, III, pp.112-6, p.62, and Jones, ‘Courtaulds’, p. 119-21 
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II 
A history of Snia Viscosa should start with the consideration that, 
along with the giant American firm DuPont and Enka in the Netherlands, 
the Italian firm represented the most successful new actor entering into 
the global rayon trade after the Great War.44 The growth of Snia Viscosa 
was impressive by all standards and relied on exports; its competitive 
strength lay in huge economies of scale and cheap labour. Before looking 
at how Courtaulds and Glanzstoff came to control it in 1927, this section 
explores the launch and early evolution of the company. It shows that 
expansion largely rested on domestic inflation and currency depreciation. 
Snia Viscosa was originally incorporated by its founder Riccardo 
Gualino in Turin in 1917 as a shipping and shipbuilding venture to 
transport coal from the USA to Italy. 45 A dramatic shortage of tonnage, 
as well as inflated coal prices, during the conflict very likely provided the 
rationale for its launch. 46 The collapse of freight rates, high rayon prices, 
cheap money and, above all, the willingness of a pioneer rayon firm, the 
French concern Comptoir des Textiles Artificiels, to sell its patents, 
Italian plants and know-how encouraged Snia Viscosa to branch out in 
the rayon industry in 1920.47 In essence, rayon was wood pulp dissolved 
                                                 44 Cerretano, ‘European cartels,’ pp.597-600 45 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits’, p.235-9; Spadoni, Il gruppo Snia, pp.45-66 46 Idem 47 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’pp. 235-45; Cerretano, ‘European cartels and technology transfer’,pp.211-5 
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and liquefied in a basic solution (namely, caustic soda) and then extruded 
by ‘spinning’ machines in the forms of filaments which solidified when 
passing through an acid bath.48 As Coleman pointed out, in the inter-war 
years the mass-production of this fibre still required huge capital outlays 
and sophisticated know-how. 49  Along with a small number of other 
industrial sectors, the rayon industry was one of those newer, high-tech 
industries which experienced rapid growth after the Great War, coming 
out of infancy and consolidating once and for all by the 1930s.50  
The history of Snia Viscosa confirms that inflation and currency 
instability were major factors at work behind the early grandiose growth 
of this industry in Italy. Unlike Britain and Germany which suffered 
from, respectively, deflation after 1920 and hyperinflation in 1922-3, and 
as with France and Belgium, Italy came out of the conflict experiencing 
moderate inflation. 51  The argument has been made that moderate 
inflation, although making it more difficult to depart from austerity in the 
1930s, helped the reconvention of the economy from a war to a peacetime 
footing.52 In examining post-war instability, the Board of Trade in 1920 
concluded that inflation ‘tends to benefit borrowers at the expense of 
                                                 
48 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p. 1-23 49 For a history of this trade after 1918 see Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp. 171-204 
50 Landes, Unbound Prometheus, pp.419-51 51 Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo, World economy, pp. 40-51; Eichengreen, ‘Understanding 1921-1927,’pp.24-56; Eichengreen, Golden fetters, pp.154-84; Baffi, ‘La rivalutazione del 1926-7’, pp. 101-22; Piluso, ‘L’Italia,’ pp. 24-30;  
52 Eichengreen, ‘Understanding 1921-1927,’pp.24-56 
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lenders’ and to ‘stimulate the enterprise that looks far ahead.’53 Historians 
dealing with the development of this trade in Italy have probably 
underestimated the fact that inflation and atypical financial 
circumstances, along with cheap Italian labour, facilitated investments in 
new and risky sectors.54 In particular, these conditions allowed, as will be 
seen below, Snia Viscosa’s exploitation of large scale economies, which 
represented the key to the success of the firm in global markets.  
Unlike its most direct competitors, Snia Viscosa became 
entrenched in the expanding market for poorer quality rayon (namely, 
rayon yarn with irregular size, dyeing properties and tensile strength) 
where it undercut high-cost producers, such as Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff. 55  Britain, the USA and, after 1927, China and India 
constituted the largest outlets of the firm (see Tables 1 and 2). Germany 
remained an important export market throughout the 1930s.56 The Italian-
German rayon cartel established in 1930 and the bilateral agreements 
                                                 53 TNA, PRO, Cabinet Papers, State of trade since the armistice and present position, undated but 1920, Cab 24/86.  
54 See in particular Bermond, Riccardo Gualino; Chiapparino, ‘Note’;  De Ianni, Gli 
affari; Limido, ‘La Snia Viscosa’; Orsi, ‘L’evoluzione’; Spadoni, Il gruppo Snia, Eichengreen, Golden fetters, pp.154-84; Eichengreen, ‘Understanding 1921-1927,’pp.24-56 55 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.280-282; Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’pp.254-5 56 Mortara, Prospettive economiche, various years; Plumpe, Die IG 
Farbenindustrie, p.311 
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between the Italian and German governments in the 1930s were 
instrumental in this outcome.57  
Table 3 shows the capitalisation of Snia Viscosa and of the whole 
Italian rayon industry. 58 The figures, which have been converted from 
current to 1913 lira using the deflator provided by the Italian statistical 
office, suggest that the firm and the whole sector in terms of 
capitalisation grew by a factor of more than five between 1922 and 
1927. 59  Table 3 also indicates that domestic competitors began to 
challenge the dominant position of Snia Viscosa from about 1927. These 
were Cisa, which operated on the basis of Comptoir’s basic patents and 
which the French came to control entirely after 1918, and Châtillon, 
which the mixed giant bank Comit launched in 1920. 60  The latter 
company remained the only rayon firm in the country to be wholly owned 
by Italian interests after 1927.61 Moreover, as the conditions of the Comit 
deteriorated after 1930, the control of Châtillon passed on to the 
government via the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale which the 
regime set up in 1933 to hold the assets previously belonging to mixed 
banks that the government bailed out after the First World War.62 
                                                 57 Guarneri, Battaglie, I, p.148;  58 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits’, pp.243-53 59 Istat, ‘Il valore’, p.65 
60 Falchero, ‘ “Quel serico filo”.’pp. 219-23 61 Idem 
62 Romeo, Breve storia, p.131 
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The growth of Snia Viscosa looks equally impressive when 
contrasted with that of its foreign rivals, Courtaulds and Glanzstoff in 
particular. This comparison is attempted in Table 4, which displays the 
output, source of capital and investment of these firms. The figures are 
expressed in terms of pounds sterling at 1927 exchange rates and were in 
the main provided by Franco Marinotti of Snia Viscosa to Raffaele 
Mattioli of the Banca Commerciale Italiana in April 1931.63 Although 
they should be viewed with caution, these seem to confirm three points. 
The first is that in terms of output, Snia Viscosa outran its competitors as 
early as 1925. Another observation is that after 1922 the Italian firm 
could command greater resources for the expansion of its plants than 
Courtaulds and Glanzstoff (see Table 4, and in particular the entry ‘credit 
to firms of the group’ under the heading ‘investment’).  
One final point is that Snia Viscosa financed expansion through 
capital subscriptions and capital reconstructions. Capital reconstructions 
were carried out on an almost yearly basis between 1922 and 1927, 
during which the nominal capital of the firm, in current lira, rose from 
175 to one billion (or from 1.6 to about  8.2  million pounds sterling at 
1913 exchange rates, but see tables 3 and 5).64 This represented a crucial 
aspect of the company’s expansion. Via capital reconstructions and the 
                                                 63 COMIT, Sofindit Papers, Memorandum of Marinotti to Raffaele Mattioli [Relazione di Marinotti a Raffaele Mattioli],April 1931, SOF 168, bundle [fasc.] 3 64 For constant values see Tables 3 
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stock market, Snia Viscosa transferred debts from a host of banks to the 
public. 65  This system could work as long as post-war inflationary 
expectations fuelled an unprecedented boom in the Milan stock 
exchange.66 Also, a strategy of debt transfer from the banks to the public 
worked smoothly as long as the company paid handsome dividends (on 
dividends see Table 4). These lured investors and encouraged the mixed 
banks, notably the Banca Commerciale, the Credito Italiano and the 
Banca Agricola Italiana, into make loans to the firm.67 
The official balance sheets seem to indicate that the firm 
accumulated debts of about 300 million lire (at 1927 exchange rates) in 
the period between 1923 and 1927 (see Table 4). 68 According to the 
minutes of the company’s board of directors, early in 1926 the floating 
debt of Snia Viscosa amounted to about 450 million current lira (or about 
5 million pounds at 1927 exchange rates) corresponding to about 50 
percent of the company’s nominal share capital.69As shown in Table 4, 
the debt of the Italian firm peaked in 1926-7, decreasing significantly 
only after that Courtaulds and Glanzstoff purchased an interest in the 
company. 
                                                 65 Cerretano, ‘The Benefit’, p.261; Piluso, ‘L’Italia’, p.30 66 Idem, p. 261-2; Confalonieri, Banche miste, II, pp.244-5; Baia Curioni, ‘Evoluzione,’p.179 67 Idem p.261; Confalonieri, Banche miste, II, pp.259-60 68 Credito Italiano, Società per azioni, various years but also Cerretano, ‘The Benefits’, p.247 (Table) 69 Snia BPD headquarters, (hereafter SNIA), Minutes of the board’s meetings, 14 June and 26 October 1926; Cerretano, ‘The benefits,’ p. 267 
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While the domestic rayon market remained almost non-existent 
until the early 1930s, currency depreciation was the key to the rapid 
conquest of foreign outlets and huge scale economies. 70 Figures about the 
exports of Snia Viscosa in the 1920s are patchy and unreliable. A clue of 
their evolution can however be gathered by looking at Italian exports 
which grew from 2.4 to 9.9 thousand metric tons between 1923 and 
1926. 71  In 1930, Italy - by far the largest source of rayon exports 
throughout the inter-war period - exported 9.9 thousand metric tons 
against 5.6 thousand of the Netherlands, 3.7 thousand of Germany and 
2.9 thousand of the U.K.72  
Scale economies and low prices, of course, also followed from 
cheap labour. Along with Japan, Italy was the only low wages country 
where this high-tech industry came to be established after the Great 
War. 73  In Italy, mostly for political reasons (that is, the coming into 
power of Mussolini from autumn 1922) wages, which were much lower 
than in Britain or in Germany, did not keep up with inflation and grew 
less than productivity after 1922.74  
Along with the still non-existent Italian rayon market, the recently 
acquired and still limited technical expertise (rayon firms took, on 
                                                 70 Cerretano, ‘The benefits,’p. 258 (Table 9) and Coleman, Courtaulds, II,pp.281-4 71 Textile Economics Bureau, Textile organon, pp.18-21 72 Idem 
73 Coleman, Courtaulds, II,pp.171-198 74 Toniolo, L’economia, pp.40-1 
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average, ten years to become technologically independent) represented a 
major source of weakness for the firm.75 As will be seen in the next 
section, the stabilization crisis after 1925, while blunting the competitive 
advantage deriving from large scale economies, exposed this 
shortcoming. In a letter to the managing director of Glanzstoff in 1929, 
Gualino, who was fascinated by Ford’s innovative ideas about mass-
production, set the output target of the company at thirty thousand metric 
tons of mid-quality rayon yarn per year. 76  This was more than the 
combined output of Snia Viscosa, Glanzstoff and Courtaulds in 1925 (see 
Table 3). Apart from the financial obstacles that this target inevitably 
posed, what made it unachievable was the fact that a large production of 
poor quality rayon yarn or waste remained the norm until the early 
1930s.77 The point is however that poor rayon was not recyclable and 
cost no less to make than high quality rayon.78 In addition, as early as 
1923, the Comptoir denied further access to French technological 
expertise owing to disagreements about the expansion of the Italian firm 
in foreign outlets. 79 Large production and limited expertise were also the 
                                                 75 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’pp. 242-3                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          76 Berta, ‘Tra le due guerre,’p.348; Glanzstoff Archives (Wuppertal), (hereafter GA), Snia Viscosa Papers, Riccardo Gualino to Fritz Bluethgen, 19 April 1929, E7-1-10bis14 77 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’p.254 
78 Idem  79 Cerretano, ‘European cartels and technology transfer,’ pp.214-5;  
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factors encouraging Snia Viscosa to become entrenched in the expanding 
but unstable market for poor quality rayon.80  
As will be seen in the next section, Snia Viscosa found a solution 
to the issue of a lack of expertise by securing technical aid from 
Glanzstoff as late as autumn 1926.81 The agreements with Courtaulds and 
the German firm following the acquisition of the company in 1927 were 
largely an extension of this arrangement. 82  These allowed the 
technological consolidation of Snia Viscosa.  
III 
The domestic conditions allowing rapid growth came to an end as 
the regime implemented monetary restoration generating a major credit 
crunch by late 1925. 83  What follows shows that once faced with the 
prospect of collapse, Snia Viscosa sold a controlling stake to Courtaulds 
and Glanzstoff in January 1927. This section concludes that the 
technological arrangements with Glanzstoff mentioned in the previous 
section did justify forms of cross-participation but not the sale of a 
controlling stake. In addition, this section confirms that Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff purchased Snia Viscosa to reduce Italian exports. As will be 
                                                 80 Idem;  
81 Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals,’p.601 
82 Idem 83 Piluso, ‘L’Italia’, pp.24-30  
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seen here and in the next section, this strategy, however, while rushed by 
Italian stabilisation crisis, did not work.  
One crucial point is that monetary restoration broke the financial 
mechanism allowing Snia Viscosa to grow.84 Just as in 1925 the firm was 
implementing an increase in the company’s share capital from 600 
million to one billion current lire (namely, from about 6.7 to little more 
than 11.0 million pounds sterling at 1927 exchange rates), the 
government and the Bank of Italy halted the expansion of the stock 
market and increased discount rates. 85  In response to the ensuing 
scramble for liquidity, in common with other large Italian firms, Snia 
Viscosa sought to raise fresh capital in a host of foreign markets.86 Only 
in London was this partly successful. There, in association with the 
merchant bank Hambros, Snia Viscosa raised the equivalent of 154 
million current lira (or about 1.7 million at 1927 exchange rates), facing 
as a result a floating debt of about 300 million current lira (about  £ 
3.3million at 1927 exchange rates) in November 1926.87  In that month 
Hambros met with Glanzstoff and Courtaulds, which were now 
increasingly interested in a price cartel in Europe, to talk about a rescue 
                                                 
84 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’p. 264 85 Baffi, ‘La rivalutazione del 1926-7’; Zamagni, Economic history, pp.244-52 86 SNIA, Minutes of the Board of Snia Viscosa, 24 November 1925; on other Italian firms see Falco, ‘La bilancia,’ pp.6-9, pp.217-8 87 SNIA, Minutes of the Board of Snia Viscosa, 24 November 1925 
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plan.88 In December, Sam Courtauld emphasised to Samuel Salvage of 
the American Viscose Corporation, the US subsidiary of Courtaulds, that 
there was ‘a reasonable possibility that Snia [Viscosa] will collapse from 
financial instability…Our future course is not quite clear in this respect, 
as the position is changing every day, I think in the direction of ultimate 
collapse.’89   
A few days after this note, Courtaulds agreed to rescue the Italian 
firm in association with Glanzstoff.90 Courtaulds and Glanzstoff provided 
Snia Viscosa with, respectively, 215 million and 71.8 million current lira 
(the equivalent at 1927 exchange rates of £1.9 million and £ 0.6 million), 
thus becoming the largest shareholders of the Italian firm. Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff held respectively 18.2 and 6.1 percent of the company’s equity 
capital, and entered into a voting pool with Gualino (see Tables 5 and 
6).91 Facing a new floating debt of 250 million current lira (or £ 2.8 
million at 1927 exchange rates), Snia Viscosa sold other blocks of shares 
to Courtaulds and Glanzstoff (respectively almost £ 0.5 million and £158 
thousand or, at 1927 exchange rates, 45 and 15 million current lira) early 
in 1928.92 On that occasion, blocks of shares worth more than 190 million 
current lira (or £ 2 million) were taken up by a group of Milan 
                                                 88 GA, Snia Transaktion, L7-5-1  89 Quoted in Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.281 90 Coleman, Courtaulds,II, pp.281-2; Cerretano, ‘The benefits,’ pp.268-71 91 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.281-2; Jones, ‘Courtaulds’, p.123; Cerretano, ‘The benefits’, p.270 (Table 12) 92 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p. 282 ;Cerretano, ‘The benefits,’p.273. 
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businessmen backed by the Credito Italiano led by Carlo Feltrinelli, the 
president of that bank, Senatore Borletti and Franco Marinotti. 93  In 
addition, a syndicate of Swiss and German banks associated with 
Glanzstoff (including the Disconto Gesellschaft, part of the Deutsche 
Bank by 1930) purchased a large interest in the company.94  
The rescue of Snia Viscosa came after that in autumn 1926 the 
Italian firm, leveraging on its large scale economies, had succeeded in 
securing technical aid from Glanzstoff.95 As part of the agreements with 
the Germans, Glanzstoff interrupted the legal battle for the infringement 
of basic patents (namely the Mueller patents) that the German firm had 
begun against Snia Viscosa in 1925.96 This move was part of broader 
cartel arrangements concerning Germany which Glanzstoff made with the 
newly-established IG Farben, Enka and Snia Viscosa in 1925-6 and 
which, among other things, limited Italian rayon exports into that 
country.97  
Coleman, Jones and Cerretano showed that the investment in Snia 
Viscosa was instrumental in the cartel schemes concerning Europe that 
Courtaulds began to pursue in association with Glanzstoff from 1924 and 
in the reduction of Italian exports into the USA, which constituted the 
                                                 93 Segreto, I Feltrinelli, pp. 291-308 94 Cerretano, ‘The benefits’, p. 275 (table 13) 95 On this point see Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals’, p.601 96 Idem 97 Idem  
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largest source of profits for the British firm. 98 In January 1927, Sam 
Courtauld announced the investment in Snia Viscosa to his company’s 
board with these words:  
As I understand it the essence of the arrangement is that Glanzstoff and 
Courtaulds offer Snia [Viscosa] certain technical assistance in return for their right to 
control the production and the prices of the latter. 
To my mind it is most important that we should not begin to teach Snia 
[Viscosa] anything at all about any improvement in their methods until we are 
satisfied that they will loyally carry out their side of the obligation. 
The main points we shall insist on are: 
1. No present increase in production 
2. No further lowering of prices anywhere 
3. Immediate restriction of imports to the USA, and rising of prices there. 
(emphasis in the original)99 
As will be seen below (see also Table 2), Snia Viscosa experienced 
a reduction of output after 1927 (the increase from 1930 also takes into 
account the output of Varedo, a medium sized rayon-maker with which 
the company merged in 1930). Information about the company’s exports 
between 1927 and 1930 is scattered and unreliable. Yet arguably these 
followed the same pattern as Italian exports which decreased in both the 
USA and in Germany between 1927 and 1928 (see Table 1).  
                                                 98 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.277-82;Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals,’p.601, pp.605-6  99 Courtaulds Archives (Coventry),(hereafter CA), Snia Viscosa papers, Sam Courtauld on Snia Viscosa, 26 January 1927, SNI.4 
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Did this reduction of exports follow from Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff’s control over the company? Table 1 shows the extent to 
which the imposition of a tariff in Britain in 1925 upset global markets, 
notably, Germany and the USA which were flooded by growing Italian 
output until 1930. A reduction of Italian exports into Germany and into 
the USA and the parallel boom of exports into China and into India 
between 1927 and 1928 may suggest that Courtaulds and Glanzstoff 
succeeded in subduing Snia Viscosa (see Tables 1 and 2). Yet it is 
difficult to disentangle the effects of this control from the adverse 
conditions of the credit crunch at home and the imposition of tariffs (in 
Britain in 1925 and in the USA in 1930) in foreign markets. 
Moreover, as shown by Coleman and Cerretano, the influence of 
European rayon cartel schemes on output and sales ought not to be over-
emphasised.100  It is safe to conclude that, while establishing a system of 
domestic import and export cartels which complemented each another 
(the first of which were the export cartel Italrayon and the import cartel 
Kunstseide-Verkaufbuero in Germany in 1931), the European rayon 
cartel never went beyond the stage of a convention or ‘gentlemen’s 
                                                 100 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.281-4; Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals’, pp. 605-10 
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agreements’ cartel. 101  In common with other cartels, rather than 
abolishing, it regulated competition.102  
Arguably, technical assistance from Glanzstoff made the 
investment in Snia Viscosa more attractive for Courtaulds. It is safe to 
conclude that this was rushed by the poor financial state of the Italian 
company. In a lengthy memorandum to the chairman of his company, the 
supervisor of Courtaulds’ foreign investment until 1930, Ernst Lunge, 
emphasised the fire sale nature of the Italian investment.103 Lunge pointed 
out that the information about the real value of Snia Viscosa was 
unavailable, and that the decision to purchase a controlling interest in 
Snia Viscosa ‘practically refusing to investigate their [i.e. of Snia 
Viscosa] intrinsic value was as unusual as it was sound’.104  ‘I venture to 
the assertion’ - concluded Lunge - ‘that the control of a leading industrial 
company [i.e. Snia Viscosa] has never before, and has never since, been 
offered on anything like such terms.’105 In explaining the Italian move, 
Lunge emphasised that Courtaulds wished to control a formidable large 
competitor ‘which was already making 10,000 tons of yarn per annum 
and might, judging from its past progress, easily make good its threat to 
                                                 101 Idem, p. 608; Fear, ‘Cartels,’ p.272, Figure 12.1 102 Idem 103 GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Ernst Lunge to Sam Courtauld, 11 April 1931, E7-1-10bis14 104 idem 105 idem 
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turn out 30,000 tons.’ 106 He argued that if the Germans showed Snia 
Viscosa how to make good rayon yarn, that ‘huge production would 
probably yield revenue for our investment in Snia [Viscosa], but what 
really mattered was that control.’107  
 The conclusion that the Italian move, while representing 
Courtaulds’ largest investment in the inter-war years, constituted a 
departure from the strategy of British firm can also be drawn from 
Coleman and Jones’ accounts.108 They showed that Courtaulds, since the 
period prior to the Great War, entered foreign markets through greenfield 
investments. 109  By contrast, the ownership advantage of Glanzstoff 
seemed to lie specifically in the company’s technological expertise and 
patent ownership.110  The history of Snia Viscosa confirms the oft-made 
point that after the conflict German firms, which found themselves short 
of finance from 1924, used their technological strength to reduce 
domestic and foreign competition.111 The acquisition of a small stake in 
Snia Viscosa, in particular, was instrumental in the reduction of Italian 
                                                 106 Idem 107 Idem 108 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.281; Jones, ‘Courtaulds’, p. 123 
109 Idem 
110 Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals,’  111 Schröter , ‘Risk and Control,’ pp. 422-3;  Teichova, An economic background, pp.54-61                              
28 
 
exports and in the monitoring of the use that the Italians could make of 
German patents and know-how.112  
IV 
So much for the motives behind Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s 
investment in Italy. But how did these firms influence the evolution of 
Snia Viscosa and the whole Italian rayon industry? While attempting this 
question, this section reviews the technological evolution of the Italian 
firm. One firm conclusion here is that the British and above all the 
Germans provided vital know-how to Snia Viscosa after 1927.  
After 1926, Snia Viscosa experienced a steep decline (the 
company’s share of global output, for example, fell from more than 11 to 
about 5 percent between 1927 and 1934, but see Table 2). Yet evidence 
seems to indicate that, more than to foreign control, poor performance 
was attributable to the quasi collapse of the Italian banking system and to 
the fragmentation of global trade after 1929.113 Heavily dependent on 
exports until 1934, Snia Viscosa was hit harder than the rivals by the 
fragmentation of global trade as well as the spectacular expansion of the 
Japanese rayon industry, the output of which grew from 7.5 to almost 45 
million metric tons between 1925 and 1933 and which expanded mostly 
                                                 112 Cerretano, ‘European cartels,’pp.600-2 113 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.281; Cerretano, ‘European cartels,’pp. 605-606 
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in the company’s most important export outlets, such as India and China 
(see Table 1). 114  
Moreover, while cartel schemes were ineffective in reducing 
exports, the Germans abandoned plans about the reduction of Snia 
Viscosa’s output in 1930, as will be seen below.115 Evidence, in sum, 
seems to point to the conclusion that foreign involvement proved crucial 
to the survival of Snia Viscosa from both a financial and technological 
standpoint.116  
The investment of Courtaulds and Glanzstoff prevented the 
financial collapse or, alternatively, the state bailout of the company. As 
deflation deepened after 1925, the government bailed out ailing banks 
and their associated firms by taking up industrial assets in exchange for 
fresh liquidity, thus becoming the country’s largest industrial stakeholder 
(mostly via the state-owned agency Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale).117 As noted in Section II, Châtillon came to be controlled 
after 1933 by the Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale. By contrast, 
                                                 114 Textile Economics Bureau, Textile Organon, pp.18-21; Cerretano, ‘European cartels,European multinationals’ p.606 (table 4) ; Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.171-204, pp.279-84.  Between 1931 and 1933, Italian exports in China fell from 6 
to 2 thousand metric tons; India absorbed 4 percent of Italian exports in 1937, as 
compared with 18 percent in 1931, but see Mortara, Prospettive, p.368; Imperial Economic Committee, Industrial Fibres, p.105 
115 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378 
116 Cerretano, ‘The benefits, 117 Zamagni, Economic history, pp. 293-301 
30 
 
Snia Viscosa fell under foreign control.118 The history of Snia Viscosa 
seems to demonstrate that the restoration of the gold standard and the 
ensuing credit crunch underpinned the internationalisation of the 
company’s equity capital (of which about 60 percent was held abroad 
after 1928), while foreign capital provided a valid alternative in the 
provision of industrial finance.119  
Moreover, it is safe to conclude that Courtaulds and, above all, 
Glanzstoff transferred vital technology and know-how to Italy after 
1927.120 We already mentioned that at the time when Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff made their investment, Snia Viscosa was still developing a 
workable know-how and, second, that in January 1927 Courtaulds, Snia 
Viscosa and Glanzstoff entered into a compact of mutual technical co-
operation.121 After 1927, there was an intense exchange of information 
between Italian and German chemists and engineers. 122  The technical 
development of the company only began however in earnest after that in 
1928 Gualino left the firm to be replaced by two Glanzstoff employees, 
Scherer and Hesse.123  
                                                 118 Falchero, ‘Quel serico filo,’pp.222-4 
119 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’p.270 
120 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p. 378 121 Cerretano, ‘European cartels, European multinationals’, p. 605 and Coleman, 
Courtaulds, II, p.282.  
122 CA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Minutes of technical discussions in Kelsterbach 
[Protokoll der technische Besprechung zwischen den VGF und der Snia am 12.July 
1927 im Kelsterbach], SNI.4 
123 GA, Ernst Lunge to Sam Courtauld, 11 April 1931, E7-1-10bis14 
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Scherer and Hesse extended a scheme called the ‘Transformation 
Système Glanzstoff’ to the Venaria Reale works in Turin, which was the 
largest and most up-to-date plant of the group. This scheme, in particular, 
envisaged a substantial reduction of output (from 17 to 12 metric tonnes a 
day) and output capacity (from 16.8 to 11 thousand nozzles) by 1929.124 
Documents about the technological development of Snia Viscosa 
revolved almost exclusively around the Venaria works, and this partly 
explains why we know comparatively less about the other plants of the 
firm.  In the time-period under consideration, Snia Viscosa maintained 
four plants, namely in Cesano Maderno and Pavia, near Milan, and in 
Venaria Reale and in Abbadia di Stura in Turin.125 While acquiring the 
Cesano, Pavia and Venaria works from the Comptoir between 1920 and 
1922, the firm established the Abbadia di Stura plant in 1924-5. 126 
Financial difficulties in the mid-1920s however brought the completion 
of the latter plant to a halt. 127  As a consequence, the Venaria works 
remained the largest and most recent plant of the group in 1927; the 
attention attached to it reflected its weight in terms of output (it 
accounted for about 40 and 46 percent of the company’ capacity and 
                                                 
124 GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Stefano Sordelli, Memorandum about the Venaria Reale 
plant [Promemoire relative à la transformation  de l’Usine de Venaria Reale], 12 
August 1930, SV 179, 
125 Cerretano, ‘The Benefits,’p.248 (Table 5). 
126 Idem. 
127 Idem 
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output in 1927) and in terms of best industry practice.128 As a leading 
technologist of Snia Viscosa and Lunge reported between summer 1930 
and spring 1931, the idea was to extend to the other plants of the firm the 
innovations stemming from Venaria, where, given its recent construction, 
innovations and economies of scale would more likely be developed.129  
According to Sordelli and Lunge, the Germans were of the opinion 
that a dramatic reduction of output was a sine qua non for the qualitative 
improvement of the company’s yarn. 130  The Italian technologists, by 
contrast, dismissed it as outright sabotage.131 One feature of the Scherer 
and Hesse scheme was the replacement of the existing spinning machines 
with those in use in Kelsterbach, Germany, which were smaller, older and 
likely to increase costs.132 As Sordelli put it, the argument of the Italians 
was that the capital equipment of Venaria works was only four years old, 
and that Snia Viscosa only needed to improve the existing system based 
on bigger spinning machines. 133  As Lunge recalled, while spinning 
machines at Venaria were being destroyed and conflicts between German 
and Italian technologists reached a new height, in June 1930, Lunge 
                                                 128 Idem.  129 GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Stefano Sordelli, Memorandum about the Venaria Reale plant [Promemoire relative à la transformation  de l’Usine de Venaria Reale], 12 August 1930, SV 179 and Ernst Lunge to Sam Courtauld, 11 April 1931, E7-1-10bis14 130 Idem 131 Idem 132 Idem 133 Idem 
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replaced Scherer with Stefano Sordelli, who had meanwhile been 
appointed manager of Venaria.134 The latter drew up a scheme intending 
to restore the original production capacity (23 metric tonnes per day) and 
the original spinning system.135 
As will be seen in the next section, the Germans abandoned plans 
for the reduction of output once and for all in 1930.136 There were three 
interconnected reasons for this change in strategy. As Coleman pointed 
out, one of these was the deterioration of relations occurring after 1929 
between Glanzstoff and Courtaulds, which controlled Snia Viscosa 
together.137 Another motive must be found in the fact that Snia Viscosa, 
given the company’s huge capitalisation, could pay dividends - these 
became matter for concern for Courtaulds after 1929 - only by avoiding a 
dramatic reduction of output, as Gualino put it to a letter to the managing 
director of Glanzstoff. 138 Most important, the growing discontent from 
Fascist circles, as will be seen in the next section, held a weight in that 
decision. 139  These became unhappy about the alleged role of foreign 
                                                 
134 Idem 135 Idem and GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Conrad Herman (Glanzstoff), Memorandum about the visit to Snia Viscosa’s works at Venaria Reale on Sunday 11 September 1930 [Aktennotiz über den Besuch bei der Snia  Werk Venaria Reale an Donnerstag dem 11.September 1930],  SV 179 
136 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378 137 Idem, pp.377-9 138 GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Gualino to Fritz Bluethgen, 3 May 1929, E7-1-15bis21,  139CA, John Hanbury-Williams papers, Balfour-Murphy to John Hanbury-Williams, 1 January 1931, JHW.51, 
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interests in the company and about the destruction of machinery in what 
still remained the largest Italian firm measured by capital.140 
As a director of Courtaulds in a visit to Italy stressed to his 
company’s board in 1933, Snia Viscosa began to produce yarn of good 
quality by the end of 1930, while Courtaulds and, above all, Glanzstoff 
made important contributions to the know-how of the Italian firm. 141 
These included improvements of the filtration systems of the liquified 
wood pulp and of the spinning bath where dissolved wood pulp would 
solidify in the forms of filaments; the ‘gear pump’, which allowed a more 
regular size of the filaments; and the establishment of textile and 
chemical laboratories in all factories of Snia Viscosa.142. In addition to 
that, Snia Viscosa reproduced innovative bleaching systems as in use in 
Courtaulds’ plants in Britain and in the U.S.A. 143  According to a 
prominent director of Glanzstoff, even the new and innovative spinning 
machines of Snia Viscosa (namely, the so-called SILM 81) developed in 
the company’s works were largely modelled on those in use at 
Glanzstoff’s works.144  
                                                 140 Idem.  141 CA, Samuel Courtauld papers, Report by J.E. Pedder on a visit to the factories of Snia Viscosa at Venaria Reale, Cesano Maderno, Pavia and Abbadia di Stura, September 1933 and Notes on Pedder’s report, 31 October 1933, SAM.12,.  142 Idem 143 Idem 144 GA, Snia Viscosa Papers, Conrad Herman (Glanzstoff), Memorandum about the visit to Snia Viscosa’s works at Venaria Reale on Sunday 11 September 1930 
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V 
The previous section mentioned that Snia Viscosa abandoned plans 
of output reduction in 1930. Here, we now turn attention to the role of the 
regime in this outcome. What emerges is that the latter facilitated 
relations with foreign stakeholders, helping however domestic interests 
regain control over the daily management of the firm.  
In 1932 and in 1936, the British and the Germans renewed the 
controlling voting pool of 1927 with the Credito Italiano, which, along 
with the Comit, was the other dominant giant mixed bank of the country, 
holding large industrial assets.145  As mentioned in Section III, Credito 
Italiano replaced Gualino in the voting pool, while the bank’s 
representatives and stakeholders joined the company’s board. These 
included the bank’s chairman Carlo Feltrinelli, Senatore Borletti, a textile 
industrialist succeeding Gualino as chairman of Snia Viscosa in 1929, 
and Franco Marinotti, a close business associate of Borletti and the 
managing director of Snia Viscosa from 1930.146 Although the British 
and the Germans kept a say in the commercial policy of the firm 
throughout the 1930s, as Coleman noted, the original plan of Courtaulds 
                                                                                                                                           [Aktennotiz über den Besuch bei der Snia  Werk Venaria Reale an Donnerstag dem 11.September 1930],  SV 179 
145 TNA, Foreign Office papers, memorandum by W. Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 February 1946, FO 371/58290 146 Idem. 
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and Glanzstoff (part of A.K.U. from 1930) to control Snia Viscosa did 
not survive after 1930.147   
Coleman attributed this loss of influence to the ‘development of the 
Fascist regime in Italy and worsening Anglo-Italian relations’.148 Crucial 
to these developments were in particular the changes in the statutes of the 
company in 1930-1. As a director of Courtaulds explained to the Foreign 
Office after the war, the new statutes forbade foreign nationals from 
running the firm, while envisaging the transfer of the controlling stakes to 
two holding companies, namely the Società Anonima Finanziaria Rayon 
(Safra) and the Società Anonima Gestioni e Partecipazioni Industriali 
(Sagepi) (see Table 8). 149   While drawing a neat line between 
management, which became in the main Italian from 1930, and 
ownership, now mostly British and German, this system of holding 
companies, as Coleman noted, ‘in itself hardly facilitated [Courtaulds and 
Glanzstoff’s] practical control’.150  
The history of Snia Viscosa confirms that, while Italy continued to 
attract a flow of investments after 1918, the regime placed renewed 
                                                 
147 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, pp.378-9 
148 Idem, p.378 
149 TNA, Foreign Office papers, memorandum by W. Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 February 1946, FO 371/58290 
150 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378  
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emphasis on investment as an engine of growth.151 Fascism welcomed 
Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s investment in Italy in an attempt to mitigate 
the credit crunch after 1925 and to facilitate the import of foreign know-
how.152 In relation to this, the history presented here adds substance to the 
claim that the regime kept good relations with multinationals bringing 
know-how into the country.153 In 1927, Courtaulds and Glanzstoff made 
their investment conditional to a ‘suitable expression of satisfaction’ from 
Mussolini. 154  When obtaining it, Gualino stressed the technological 
benefits deriving from foreign participation. 155   The ‘foreign groups 
provide Snia Viscosa with the right to use all their patents, advances and 
know-how’ - wrote a representative of Snia Viscosa to the Duce in 
January 1927 - ‘and undertake to send their technologists to implement 
these methods in the plants of the company.’156 For the same reasons 
Mussolini intervened personally to avoid the sequestration of Courtaulds’ 
                                                 151 Piluso, ‘L’Italia’, pp. 24-30.; Colli, ‘Foreign enterprises,’pp.92-3 and idem, ‘Multinationals,’ p.305; Amatori and Colli, Impresa e industria, pp.31-5; Amatori and Colli, ‘La grande impresa’, p. 695  152 Colli, ‘Multinationals,’ p. 308 and Toninelli, ‘Between Agnelli and Mussolini,’ p.356, p.360 153 Colli, ‘Multinationals,’ p. 308; Toninelli, ‘ Between Agnelli and Mussolini’ ; ACS, IRI, Notes and memorandum on Fassini’s proposal [Note e memoria sulle proposte di Fassini], Negotiations for the merger between Cisa and Châtillon [Trattative di fusione Cisa-Châtillon], 22 February and 7 April 1936, IRI –SR 15, B15 154 CA, Snia Viscosa Papers,  Glanzstoff to Courtaulds’ Board, 17 January 1927, SNI.6 155 ACS, Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Memorandum by Marchesini to Mussolini [Memoria di Marchesini al Duce], 12 March 1927, SPD, CR, B102, F169/R 156 Idem 
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stake after that Italy entered the conflict on the side of Nazi Germany in 
May 1940. 157  In a memorandum dated 1941, the Italian Ministry for 
Finance stressed that the Italian government considered ‘the financial 
participation of foreign groups in national companies favourably’ because 
this facilitated ‘technical and commercial co-operation.’158 Little wonder, 
then, that the same memorandum stressed that the assets in foreign hands 
had not been sequestrated as enemy property.159  
The history of Snia Viscosa also lends credence to the view that the 
regime withstood foreign interests when these became, in the words of 
Colli, a threat for ‘national champions.’160 The point has also recently 
been made in relation to Norway that political factors, notably rising 
economic nationalism, proved as important as economic forces in shaping 
the relationship between the government and foreign firms as well as the 
success of multinationals after 1918.161  
In connection to this, it should be mentioned that Borletti justified 
the changes in the statutes on political grounds.162As Lunge recalled, 
Borletti announced a reform of the firm’s statutes as a matter of urgency 
                                                 157 Coleman, Courtaulds, III, p.109 158 ACS, IRI, Memorandum of the Ministry for Finance [Relazione del Ministero delle Finanze], undated but 1941’, SR: Fasc. Châtillon  159 Idem.  
160 Colli, ‘Multinationals’, p.308;  161 Jones, Multinationals and global capitalism, p.277; Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big business’, p.111, pp.119-23, p.129  
162 On Credito Italiano, Borletti and his associates see Segreto, I Feltrinelli, pp.291-
308; and Castronovo- Falchero, L’avventura, pp. 81-117 
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in December 1930. 163  This reform imposed the transfer of preference 
shares bearing multiple votes and allowing control over the firm (see 
Tables 6, 7 and 8) first to the Società Marittima Commerciale, a 
moribund company of the group, and, in 1933, to Safra and Sagepi (see 
Table 8).164 Borletti justified the new provisions with these words:  
Those changes have not been carried out for the sake of it…but have been 
imposed by factors, I would say, of political and general nature…those changes 
have been proposed only to moralise, so to speak, the situation. 165 
There is reason to believe that the justification that Borletti 
provided for his move was not simply a fine piece of business 
opportunism. Coleman argued that the changes in the statutes and the 
creation of these holding companies followed new provisions of Italian 
law.166  It would however be safer to infer that these reflected a stronger 
nationalistic stance and a changing attitude towards foreign investment 
after 1929.167  As Colli and Amatori warned, economic nationalism and 
the emphasis on ‘corporativism’, which was rather suggestive of a trend 
towards economic self-sufficiency and an alternative to both market 
                                                 
163 CA, John Hanbury-Williams Papers, Memorandum of Lunge to John Hanbury-
Williams, 1 December 1930, JHW.16 164 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378 and idem, Courtaulds, III, p. 108; CA, John Hanbury-Williams Papers, Memorandum by Arthur Johnson regarding proposed new holding company for Snia preference voting shares, undated but 1933, JHW.16; TNA, Foreign Office papers, memorandum by W. Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 February 1946, FO 371/58290 165 Idem 
166 Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p.378 and idem, Courtaulds, III, p.108  
167 De Felice, Mussolini il Duce, I, p.135; Zamagni, An economic history, p.269; 
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capitalism and communism, reflected the adaptation of the Italian 
economy to the transformation of the global economy after 1929. 168 
Under the impact of the depression, moreover, vested interests found it 
easier to influence ownership and industrial policy.169  
Nationalism translated into a series of hostile measures against 
foreign influences.170 One well-documented case pertains to the decision 
of Mussolini to deny Ford the approval to set up business in Italy, a move 
for which Fiat lobbied.171 As for Snia Viscosa, police reports increasingly 
emphasised after 1929 that the bailout and the industrial policy of Snia 
Viscosa after 1927 raised much criticism from within various prominent 
Fascist circles.172 Early in 1931, an informant complained to Mussolini 
that, although saving the firm from collapse, foreign intervention was 
humiliating.173 A liaison officer of Courtaulds reported that the German 
officials in Snia Viscosa had gained a very bad reputation in ‘Northern 
Italian Fascist circles owing to [their] insistence that production should be 
very much reduced.’ 174  Economic nationalism had implications on 
                                                 
168 Amatori e Colli, Impresa e industria, p.175  
169 De Felice, Mussolini il Duce, I, p.157 170 Colli-Amatori, Impresa e industria, p.175;  171 Castronovo, Giovanni Agnelli, pp.339-45; Toninelli, ‘Between Agnelli and Mussolini,’pp.356-60 172 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (hereafter ACS), Segreteria Particolare del Duce, Notes to Mussolini on the General Assembly of Snia Viscosa, 31 marzo 1931 [Note al Duce sull’assemblea general della Snia Viscosa], , CR, b102, f169/R 173 Idem 174 CA, John Hanbury-Williams Papers, Balfour-Murphy to Hanbury-Williams, 1 January 1931, JHW.51 
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strategy and on the structure of the industry. In the 1930s, the Istituto per 
la Ricostruzione Industriale repeatedly rejected proposals envisaging the 
merger of Snia Viscosa with Châtillon (which, as mentioned in Section II, 
was now owned by the Istituto) and the Cisa group (which was the Italian 
subsidiary of the Comptoir).175 The argument was that that merger would 
give foreign interests a controlling hand on what would become a 
domestic monopoly.176 Confirming that the launch of Safra and Sagepi 
was influenced by political factors was also a memorandum of the Istituto 
per la Ricostruzione Industriale reporting that ‘in one of our 
conversations, Borletti has denied [foreign] control [and] in order to 
prove this he has shown the statutes of Safra and Sagepi.’177 
While trying to keep Courtaulds and Glanzstoff at bay from the 
management of the firm, Borletti and his associate Marinotti made Snia 
Viscosa profitable once again (Table 5). 178  They reduced investments 
(see Table 5), implementing a merger with the Varedo company, a 
medium sized competitor, and a reduction of the company’s share capital 
from one billion to 300 million lire in 1931.179 The reduction of capital 
                                                 175 ACS, IRI, SR, Memorandum IRI on Snia’s shares [Relazione IRI su Azioni Snia ], 3 November 1933 in Negotiations for the merger between Cisa and Châtillon [Trattative di fusione Cisa-Châtillon], 22 February and 7 April 1936, IRI –SR 15, B15,  176 Idem 
177 ACS, IRI, SR, Snia’s shares [Azioni Snia], 3 November 1933 in IRI –SR 15, B15: negotiations with Snia Viscosa [trattative con Snia Viscosa], 1935 
178 Spadoni, Il gruppo Snia, p.104-8 
179 Idem, p.105 
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left the size of Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s share in Snia Viscosa 
unchanged, as Tables 6 and 7 show. It however allowed a huge shift of 
resources to reserves, which grew considerably in relation to nominal and 
subscribed capital. As Borletti stressed, this move reflected a scramble 
for liquidity and the aim of the big shareholders, namely Courtaulds and 
the ailing Credito Italiano, to reduce financial commitment. 180 
During the latter half of the 1930s, while Glanzstoff reduced its 
participation by selling the bulk of its ordinary shares to Safra in 1935 
(the German firm retained the preference shares of Snia Viscosa until 
1947), Courtaulds kept a large share in Snia Viscosa (18.5 percent of the 
capital and 28 percent of the votes, but see Tables 6 and 7). The Italian 
firm paid dividends in the 1930s, becoming a good source of profits for 
the British. 181  Courtaulds likely accepted a loss of influence to gain 
dividend payments, while, as Jones emphasised, this became mostly a 
portfolio investment. 182  While in general acceptable, this conclusion 
needs some qualifications, the most important of which is that the profits 
could not be remitted in the 1930s while Snia Viscosa became an 
important source of new technology for the British in the 1930s.183 
VI 
                                                 180 CA, John Hanbury-Williams Papers, Borletti to Hanbury-Williams, 21 November 1930, JHW.16 181 Idem and Jones, ‘Courtaulds,’ p.121 182 Idem. 183Coleman, Courtaulds, II, p. 379 and idem, Courtaulds, III, p.108 
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In sum, after initial growth fuelled by inflation, Snia Viscosa came 
to be taken over by foreign firms in 1927. This article has sought to direct 
attention to the weight of the stabilisation crisis after 1925 in this 
outcome. The huge scale economies, cheap labour and profitability of 
Snia Viscosa might provide an incentive to Courtaulds and Glanzstoff’s 
move in Italy. Moreover, this investment was likely also influenced by 
the European cartel arrangements that these firms had put in place since 
1924-5. Evidence however points to the conclusion that it was triggered 
by the deteriorating conditions of the country and Snia Viscosa in 
particular. While inflation had been crucial in the early development of 
the firm, deflation and the credit crunch after 1925 exposed the weak 
financial structure of Snia Viscosa. The credit crunch and monetary 
restoration also smoothed inward foreign investment and, with it, the 
internationalisation of the company’s equity capital. In the context of the 
mid-1920s, the joint investment of Courtaulds and Glanzstoff salvaged 
Snia Viscosa and the Italian rayon industry from collapse, likely avoiding 
state bail-out. At a more general level, there also seems to be here some 
indications on how recessions, by offering multinational firms the chance 
of making fire sale investments in host economies, reshaped patterns of 
foreign investment after 1918.  
Moreover, while coming under the control of foreign interests, the 
rayon industry became one of the largest and most technologically 
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advanced manufacturing sectors in Italy after 1918. 184  There is no 
exaggeration in the claim that its growth represented a central episode in 
the industrialisation of the country.185 This is one reason why the history 
of Snia Viscosa offers a particular vantage point in the analysis of the 
benefits that firms which were taken over derived from foreign 
investment.186 This also sheds light on the weight of multinationals in the 
international spread of industry.187 The evidence presented here, finally, 
seems fully consistent with Colli’s claim that foreign influences had a 
greater role in Italy’s industrialisation than hitherto suggested by Italian 
historians.188 Foreign firms provided long-term capital and know-how to 
Snia Viscosa, thus helping the Italians to develop innovative 
technologies.  
Another hypothesis emerging from this account is that between 
foreign interests and the Italian government there probably was what 
Jones, Sandvik and Storli identified as a power struggle which the crisis 
exacerbated.189 The regime welcomed the investment in Snia Viscosa, but 
also resisted dramatic output reductions. As this article has shown, the 
prospect of acquiring foreign technology and expertise represented a 
                                                 184 Zamagni, Economic History, p. 276; Romeo, Breve storia, pp.115-6, p.120 
185 Idem. 
186 Wilkins, ‘Comparative hosts,’ 
187 Idem  188 Colli,‘Foreign enterprises,’, p.97 and ‘Multinationals‘, p.304 
189 Jones, Multinationals and global business, p.277; Sandvik and Storli, ‘Big Business.’, p.111, p.129 
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major element at work behind this posture. The history of Snia Viscosa 
seems however to indicate that there was a tension between the 
acquisition of foreign know-how and unrestrained growth, a point that the 
historical literature on technology transfer and multinational business 
seems to have generally underrated and that would be worth pursuing in 
future research.190 
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Table 1 Italian rayon exports (in metric tons) by destination, 1922-8 
 
        
 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 
        
        
Germany 113.0 122.0 196.0 725.0 2,475.0 3,529.0 3,211.0 
UK 91.0 831.0 1,601.0 2,019.0 387.0 371.0 459.0 
USA 360.0 233.0 107.0 1,484.0 970.0 2,860.0 2,056.0 
India 1.0 30.0 102.0 462.0 1,300.0 1,795.0 1,508.0 
China : 114.0 223.0 433.0 1,181.0 2,211.0 4,006.0 
Others 886.0 996.0 2,354.0 2,137.0 3,478.0 4,091.0 3,764.0 
Total 1,451.0 2,326.0 4,583.0 7,260.0 9,791.0 14,857.0 15,004.0 
        
Source: Mortara, Prospettive 
 
 
 200 
 
Table 2. Snia Viscosa: share of Italian and world’s output and exports, 1928-34 
 
 
 Output a  Exports 
 
Thousand  
metric tons 
As %  
Italy 
As % 
world 
 
 
Thousand 
metric tons 
As %  
Snia  
output 
As %  
Italian  
exports 
As % 
world’s 
exports 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1921 0.9 61.0 4.0      
1922 1.7 56.0 4.8      
1923 3.0 59.9 6.4      
1924 5.3 50.5 8.1      
1925 9.5 67.8 11.2      
1926 10.5 58.3 10.7      
1927 13.0 52.0 9.7      
1928 10.5 40.4 6.4      
1929 9.1 30.2 5.0      
1930 11.8 38.1 5.6  8.3 72.2 43.9 14.9 
1931 15.5 49.1 6.9  9.4 60.6 41.8 16.5 
1932 12.5 41.0 5.3  8.1 64.8 42.9 14.7 
1933 12.8 39.4 4.3  9.2 71.9 48.2 16.1 
1934 17.4 44.7 5.0  4.8 85.1 49.3 20.9 
 
                                                          
 
Note: a) From 1930, figures about Snia Viscosa’s output include the newly acquired Varedo company, the output of 
which in 1929 was 3.9 thousand metric tons.  
Sources:  col 1 and col 4-5, TNA, Foreign Office Papers, Memorandum by W. Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 
February 1946, FO 371/58290; col 6-7, Imperial Economic Committee, Industrial Fibres, 1937 and 1939;col.2-3, Textile 
Economics Bureau, Textile Organon 1962, p.18 
 
Table 3 Italy: rayon firms and their capitalisation (subscribed capital plus reserves) in million lire and in million pounds in 1913 values 
 
 
Source: Credito Italiano, Società per azioni various years; Istat, ‘Il valore’, p.65; Exchange rate: 25.43 lire to the pound in December 1913 from Cotula-
Spaventa, La politica monetaria, p.857, (Tab A14) 
 
Snia Viscosa Châtillon Cisa Group Others Total Number of firms 
 
L £ % L £ % L £ % L £ % L £ % 
 1913 
      
5.3 0.21 100    5.3 0.21 100 1 
1922 42.5 1.67 52.3 7.4 0.29 9.1 9.7 0.38 11.9 0.9 0.01 26.7 60.5 2.4 100 2 
1923 92.2 3.62 67.3 7.6 0.30 5.5 14.7 0.58 10.7 0.9 0.28 16.5 115.4 4.8 100 3 
1924 148.3 5.83 65.2 25.0 0.98 10.8 24.3 0.96 10.5 1.2 0.30 13.5 198.8 8.1 100 6 
1925 172.8 6.80 65.8 31.8 1.25 10.0 29.6 1.16 9.3 1.9 0.64 15.0 236.1 9.9 100 5 
1926 237.3 9.33 58.0 41.7 1.64 11.1 40.8 1.60 10.9 2.9 2.63 20.0 322.7 15.2 100 6 
1927 275.5 10.83 58.2 45.7 1.80 9.7 55.5 2.18 11.7 3.8 2.51 20.4 380.5 17.3 100 4 
1928 238.2 9.36 50.9 58.4 2.30 12.5 79.5 3.13 17.0 3.6 0.38 19.6 379.7 15.2 100 9 
1929 235.3 9.25 48.5 57.6 2.26 12.0 78.3 3.08 16.3 4.4 0.41 23.2 375.6 15.0 100 8 
1930 241.6 9.50 48.3 47.3 1.86 9.1 81.0 3.19 15.7 5.5 0.37 26.9 375.4 14.9 100 3 
1931 112.8 4.44 34.0 52.7 2.07 15.9 89.6 3.52 27.0 3.0 0.90 23.0 258.1 10.9 100 3 
1932 121.3 4.77 29.1 54.1 2.13 15.3 97.2 3.82 27.6 3.9 1.14 28.0 276.5 11.9 100 3 
1933 135.3 5.32 45.2 31.4 1.23 11.5 86.5 3.40 31.7 1.2 1.46 11.6 254.4 11.4 100 4 
1934 127.7 5.02 37.1 33.1 1.30 10.5 70.3 2.76 22.2 3.8 1.36 30.2 234.9 10.4 100 7 
1935 42.5 1.67 38.6 32.7 1.29 10.7 50.4 1.98 16.4 4.1 0.72 34.3 129.7 5.7 100 10 
1936 92.2 3.62 36.5 30.9 1.22 10.1 30.9 1.22 15.6 1.2 0.77 37.8 155.2 6.8 100 12 
1937 148.3 5.83 48.9 28.5 1.12 12.3 na na na 1.1 1.16 38.8 177.9 8.1 100 18 
1938 172.8 6.80 53.7 26.4 1.04 11.2 na na na 1.0 0.58 35.1 200.2 8.4 100 16 
Table 4 Courtaulds, Glanzstoff, Snia Viscosa: output (home markets only) in thousand metric tons and sources of capital and investment in million pound sterling 
(1927 exchange rates) 
 
 Output  Sources of capital  Investment 
     Subscribed 
capital 
 Funds and 
reserves 
 Debt  Total  Plants, 
machinery, 
materials 
 Holdings  Credit to firms of 
the group 
 Total 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)        (5)    (6)    (7)      
 Cou Gla Sni  Cour Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni  Cou Gla Sni 
1920  2.9 2.1 0.5                                 
1921 3.1 2.6 0.9  12.0  1.9  2.0  0.0  3.8  3.0  17.8  1.9  2.6  0.5  13.2  1.6  0.7  2.7  16.5  4.8 
1922 4.9 3.7 1.7  12.0  1.9  4.0  0.0  3.6  2.8  19.6  1.9  2.7  0.2      
14.7 
 1.0  0.5  2.9  17.9  4.1 
1923 6.5 2.9 2.9  12.0  3.8  6.4  0.3  3.8  2.9  22.2  4.1  3.5  2.8  15.1  0.9  0.7  3.5  19.3  7.3 
1924 8.7 4.7 5.3  20.0 1.5 6.5  9.4 0.3 0.3  4.6 0.1 2.0  34.0 2.1 6.9  4.2 0.7 3.6  25.2 0.6 1.2  0.8 0.6 4.6  30.2 1.9 9.5 
1925 10.6 5.7 9.5  20.0 1.5 8.1  12.2 0.2 0.8     4.8 0.2 2.2  37.0 2.1 9.0  5.7 1.0 5.7  26.2 0.7 2.5  0.8 0.3 5.8  32.7 2.1 14.1 
1926 9.5 4.2 10.5  20.0 2.1 9.5  16.2 1.2 3.7  5.3 0.7 4.2  41.5 3.4 13.3  7.3 1.0 9.0  26.1 1.0 2.6  0.7 0.7 5.1  34.1 2.7 16.6 
1927 12.5 8.2 13.0  20.0 3.0 10.8  36.2 5.9 3.3  3.5 0.9 4.6  59.7 11.2 14.1  7.7 1.5 9.4  33.3 1.9 3.1  1.3 1.2 4.8  42.3 4.6 17.4 
1928 14.4 8.7 10.5  32.0 3.7 10.8  15.0 5.8 0.5  3.8 0.1 1.6  50.9 11.8 11.3  8.7 2.7 9.2  36.4 4.3 1.4  1.3 1.3 3.1  46.5 8.4 13.6 
1929 11.9 10.4 9.9  32.0 3.7 10.8  15.5 4.2 0.5  3.7 0.1 1.5  51.3 11.7 11.3  9.1 2.6 8.7  33.0 3.6 1.3  0.7 1.9 3.1  42.9 8.1 13.1 
Sources: col.1, Cerretano,‘The benefits’, Tab.6, p.249; col 2-7, Franco Marinotti, Relazione a Raffaele Mattioli [memorandum to R.Mattioli],April 1931,Sofindit 
Papers, SOF 168 fasc.3, Archivio Storico della Banca Commerciale Italiana,Milan 
 
 
Table 5 Snia Viscosa: Holdings, Turnover, Profits, Dividends and Capital in Million Lira (L) and Million Pounds Sterling (£), 1918-34 (1913 values) 
 
  Holdings Turnovera Gross Profits:  
 
Less Depreciation (X) 
and Net Profits Dividends:  Capital:  
     
Trading (X) and  
Total (Y) 
Taxes and Expenses 
(Y) 
  
Overall (X); As % 
Nominal (X), Subscribed (Y), and 
Reserves (Z) 
               
Sub.Capital (Y); 
current L per sh (z) 
      
                      
          X Y X Y     X Y Z X Y Z 
 
L £ L £ L £ L £ L £ L £ L £ L % L L £ L £ L £ 
                        1918 
  
  
  
1.9 0.07 
  
0.2 0.01 1.6 0.06 1.2 8.0 8.0 15.1 0.60 15.1 0.60 0.1 : 
1919 
  
  
  
3.7 0.15 
  
1.0 0.04 2.7 0.11 1.2 2.6 8.0 44.8 1.76 44.8 1.76 0.1 : 
1920 
  
  
  
12.7 0.50 
  
8.5 0.34 4.2 0.16 2.3 4.0 4.0 56.8 2.23 56.8 2.23 0.1 0.01 
1921 
  
  
  
10.0 0.39 
  
12.0 0.47 : : : : : 42.0 1.65 42.0 1.65 0.3 0.01 
1922 
  
16.9 0.66 
  
2.0 0.08 
  
12.0 0.47 : : : : : 42.2 1.66 42.2 1.66 0.3 0.01 
1923 
  
21.8 0.86 
  
15.7 0.62 
  
8.9 0.35 6.8 0.27 5.4 6.3 16.0 85.0 3.34 85.0 3.34 7.2 0.28 
1924 
  
37.1 1.46 
  
24.5 0.96 
  
10.4 0.41 14.1 0.55 9.7 6.8 20.0 140.7 5.53 140.7 5.53 7.6 0.30 
1925 50.0 1.97 67.8 2.67 
  
42.5 1.67 
  
11.5 0.45 31.0 1.22 15.7 7.5 25.0 208.8 8.21 156.6 6.16 16.2 0.64 
1926 
      
33.2 1.31 
  
14.3 0.56 18.9 0.74 13.4 6.9 20.0 193.5 7.61 170.3 6.70 67.0 2.63 
1927 60.7 2.39 85.2 3.35 
  
23.4 0.92 
  
13.5 0.53 9.8 0.39 : : : 211.7 8.32 211.7 8.32 63.8 2.51 
1928 28.7 1.13 75.4 2.96 19.4 0.763 22.8 0.90 8.0 0.32 22.7 0.89 : : : : : 228.4 8.98 228.4 8.98 9.8 0.38 
1929 26.1 1.03 70.0 2.75 10.1 0.399 10.7 0.42 7.6 0.30 2.9 0.11 0.2 0.01 : : : 224.8 8.84 224.8 8.84 10.5 0.41 
1930 31.4 1.24 61.6 2.42 9.5 0.374 9.8 0.38 7.2 0.28 5.0 0.20 2.5 0.10 : : : 232.2 9.13 232.2 9.13 9.4 0.37 
1931 29.0 1.14 41.8 1.64 16.0 0.628 17.2 0.68 5.5 0.22 5.6 0.22 6.0 0.24 5.4 6.0 12.0 90.0 3.54 90.0 3.54 22.8 0.90 
1932 38.8 1.53 56.3 2.22 14.2 0.559 15.5 0.61 5.7 0.22 4.0 0.16 5.9 0.23 5.5 6.0 12.0 92.4 3.63 92.4 3.63 28.9 1.14 
1933 44.9 1.76 63.2 2.49 17.9 0.703 19.6 0.77 6.6 0.26 6.6 0.26 6.5 0.25 5.9 7.0 14.0 98.2 3.86 98.2 3.86 37.1 1.46 
1934 31.7 1.25 
  
21.6 0.849 22.7 0.89 7.8 0.31 7.8 0.31 7.7 0.30 6.2 8.0 16.0 93.2 3.66 93.2 3.66 34.5 1.36 
Note: a) Between 1922 and 1925:  six months only.  
Sources: Snia Viscosa official balance sheets and minutes of the board’s meetings; columns in lira, Istat, ‘Il valore’, p. 65; Exchange rates L/£: 25.4 in December 1913, see Cotula –Spaventa, La 
politica, p.857 (Tab.A14) 
                                                 
 
Table 6. Snia Viscosa: distribution of shares and votes in 1927 
  Shares   Voting power 
 Preference  Ordinary  Total  Preference  Ordinary  Total 
            
 000 %  000 %  000 %         000 %        000 %  000 % 
                  
Courtaulds 135.0 67.5  1,080.0 16.7  1,215.0 18.2  1,350.0 67.5  1,080.0 16.7  2,430.0 28.7 
VGF 40.0 22.5  360.0 5.6  405.0 6.1  450.0 22.5  360.0 5.6  810.0 9.6 
Gualino 20.0 10.0  200.0 3.0  220.0 3.3  200.0 10.0  200.0 3.0  400.0 4.7 
Hambros : :  600.0 9.3  600.0 9.0  : :  600.0 9.3  600.0 7.1 
Voting pool 200.0 100.0  2,240.0 34.7  2,440.0 36.6  2,000.0 100.0  2,240.0 34.7  4,240.0 50.1 
                  
Not 
controlled 
: :  4,266.0 65.3  4,226.0 63.4  : :  4,226.0 65.4  4,226.0 49.9 
Total 200.0 100.0  6,466.0 100.0  6,666.0 100.0  2,000.0 100.0  6,466.0 100.0  8,466.0 100.0 
                  
   Source: CA, Snia Viscosa Papers, SNI.4, Notes on Snia, undated  
 
 
Table 7. Snia Viscosa: distribution of shares and votes in 1945 
              
 
Shares  
(Thousand) 
  
Share capital 
  
Voting power 
(Thousand) 
 
                  
 Ordinary  Preference  Total  
Current  
million lire  %  Ordinary  Preference  Total   
                 % 
Courtaulds 453.9 68.3 522.1 156.6 15.5 453.8 683.3 1,137.1 23.3 
Hambros 209.4 : 209.4 62.9 6.2 209.4 :  209.4 4.1 
A.K.U : 18.9 18.9 5.7 0.5 : 189.0 189.0 3.8 
Snia,Cisa,CTA 2,528.8 80.8 2,609.6 782.9 77.8 2,528.8 807.7 3,336.5 68.8 
          
Total 3,192.0 168.0 2,360.0 1,008.0 
100.
0 3,192.0 1,680.0 4,872.0 100.0 
          
Source: Report by W. Allit on Snia Viscosa, August 1945 in CA, SAM.48; Memorandum by W. 
Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 February 1946 in TNA, Foreign office papers, FO 
371/58290 
 
 
  
 
 Tab. 8. Snia Viscosa: preference shares and holding companies in 1933 
   
SAGEPI  SAFRA 
   
                
   number 
of shares 
 million 
current 
lire 
 % 
of capital 
  number 
of shares 
 million 
 current 
lire 
 % 
of capital 
 
                
 Courtaulds  33,750  6.8  75.0  SAGEPI shares 
(Court.) 
33,750  6.8  30.7  
                
 Glanzstoff/
AKU 
 11,250  2.2  25.0  SAGEPI shares 
(VGF) 
11,250  2.2  10.3  
                
         Credito-Borletti 's  
preference shares 
30,000  6.0  27.2  
                
         Snia's ordinary 
shares 
35,000  7.0  31.8  
                
 Total 
capital 
 45,000  9.0  100.0  Total capital 110,000  22.0  100.0  
                
Source: TNA, Foreign Office Papers, Memorandum by W. Allit to the British Embassy in Rome, 9 February 1946, 
FO 371/58290 
 
